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I.

INTRODUCTION
Population growth in underdeveloped countries reached unprecedented

levels during1he last two decades as a resuit of a rapid decline in mor
tality rates.

The present trend of demographic transition in these coun

tries is different from the industrializ ed countries when they were at
similar stages of development, where the decline In mortality rates more
or less coincided with a reduction in natality. Also, the decline in
mortality was much slower than what the underdeveloped countries are ex
periencing.

In underdeveloped countries, the crude birth rates have re

mained around forty per thousand, while slightly higher in Africa and the
Middle East.

During the last two decades the death rates have rapidly

declined to around fifteen per thousand, resulting In an average annual
population growth rate of 2.5 percent.
At the same time, the present annual rate of population growth in
industrializ ed countries is less than half of the population growth rate
of the underdeveloped countries. The difference in popuiatlon growth has
become so prominent between these two groups of countries that it ls often
used as a criterium in order to distinguish the level of economic develop
ment. Dudley Kirk drawing attention to the sharp dichotomy between the
natality in developed and underdeveloped countries suggests that "natality
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is itself perhaps the best single socio-economic variable distinguishing
1 J. Spengler also points out
developed and less developed countries".
rate
that gross reproduction /is below 2 in al I developed countries, and above
2 in all the underdeveloped world which includes nearly al I African, Asian
2
and Latin American countries.
The rapid population increase in the underdeveloped countries has
caused widespread concern. For example the Pearson Commission Report states
that:
"No other phenomenon casts a darker shadow over the prospect for
international development than the staggering growth of population.
It is evident that it is a major cause of the discrepancy between
113
rates of economic improvement in rich and poor countries

The high rate of population growth presents a serious challenge to
policy makers and planners in the underdeveloped countries.

While the pro

blem is more acute in high-density countries, the rapid increase in popu
lation claims the modest gains in output everywhere and slows down the
I. D. Kirk, "Natality in the Developing Countries: Recent Trends
and Prospects", in S. J. Behrman et al., eds., Fertility and Family
Planning: A World View. (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1963), p. 76.
2. J. J. Spengler, "The Economist and the Population Question"', AER,
March 1966, p. 15.
3. Partners in Development, Report of the Commission on lnter
national Development, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969) p. 55.
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potential improvements in per capita incomes. During the last two decades
the gross domestic product in underdeveloped countries increased by
5 percent annually, but because of the 2.5 percent population growth the
per capita income increase was I imlted to around 2.5 percent, a level
wel I below the 3.6 percent per capita Income increase in the industrialized
countries. 4

Also, it is broadly accepted that high rates of population

growth impede development by adversely affecting the level of domestic
savings, the composition of output, and the already severe unemployment.
It is small wonder that the governments in no less than 30 countries have
launched family planning programs in order to reduce the pressures origi
nating from high ferti I ity.
Concern over the so-cal led "population explosion" Is also evident In
the more developed countries. Even though the population grows at a much
slower rate and the pressures of population on resources is felt with
much less intensity, the "world crisis in population" also concerns the
public in developed countries-

The legitimate outcry of the environmenta

l i st certain I y does not rep resent the tota I source of concern.

Present I y

some 70 percent of the world population lives in the underdeveloped coun
tries, and given the present rates of population growth, this ratio wi II be
no less than 75 percent by the turn of the century.

! f h 1gh fert ii ity

proves to be detrimental to the improvement of existing I iving standards,
it may present a serious cha! lenge to the social and political stability
4.

Ibid, p. 55.
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in the world.

The policy makers in countrie s with higher material stan

dards are concerne d about the potentia i problems that may arise in a
world community whose members are getting relative ly poorer. This kind of
conside ration urged the governments of these countrie s and the inter
national bodies where the rich countrie s are dominant to mobilize their
resource s in curbing the rapid popuiati on growth in poor countrie s.
Despite this understa ndable concern over the populati on issue, present
knowledge of the causes of differen tial fertilit y is sti I I in its infancy.
It is only during the last ten or fifteen years that economi sts have shown
genuine interes t In the interact ion between the socio-ec onomic and demo
graphic factors.

However, in a relative ly short period of time an im

pressive list of studies has

been compiled in the West explorin g the im

pact of such variable s as income, urbaniza tion and educatio n on the fer
tility behavio r of families .

The studies on this subject have basicall y

covered the more developed countrie s. Insuffic ient data has discoura ged
similar studies in underdeveloped countrie s where the need is actually
greater.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relation ship between
various socio-ec onomic variable s and ferti tity in Turkey.

Total fertilit y

and chi Id-woman ratios have been taken as the dependent variable s and
their relation ship with the level of income, educatio n, urbaniza tion and
industr ializatio n have been explored .

It would be appropr iate here to

outline briefly the state of our knowledge on the question we are dealing
·with before going into the detailed discussi on of the methodology employed
and the findings of the study.
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11.

A SUMMARY SURVEY OF THE ECONOMICS OF POPULATION

Malthus' views on population Influenced the economic thinking on the
role of the population throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
This is not to say that those who wrote on population during this period
always agreed with Malthus' prediction that the world population increas
ing geometrical ly would outstrip food supplies which increase only by ad
dition.

But the economists centered their arguments around the issue of

whether the fixed supply of land was a limiting factor particularly In view
of the impressive Increases In yields as a result of technologic al improve
ments, or whether the notion of optimum population (which suggests that
there is an optimum combination of and and resources after which the re
turns to labor would diminish) was relevant or not.
It was after 1930, according to J. J. Spengler, that the body of econo
mic thinking on the population issue was diverted from its Malthusian
5 In the 1930's economists became concerned with the issue of
base.
whether the populations In the Western countries would become stationary
or even decline.

The idea that rapid population growth would be condu-

cive to economic growth via increased demand for consumption and/or in
vestments was popularized in this era by the stagnationl st authors.

Mean

while, the so-cal led "Malthusian traps" seemed to be losing its appeal
on account of an observable decrease in the estimated share of land and
natural resources in economic growth compared with the share of capital
accumulation and technologic al change.
5.

J. J. Spengler, 21!.· cit., p. 6.
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But since the end of the Second World War

revolutionary changes have

taken piece In the pattern of population growth particularly in the under
developed countries.

There has been a revival of interest among the

economists on the population issue as a result of this development.

Never

theless, save the exceptions of H. Liebenstein 1 s 6 and R. Nelson 1 s 7 attempts
to incorporate population growth into theory, the numerous growth models
that have been developed throughout this period remained surprisingly
aloof towards the population phenomenon. And most economic models which
attempted to incorporate the demographic factors treated population as an
exogenous variable, losing much of their realism by not taking into ac
count the fact that the demographic variables themselves are affected by
socio-economic variables. Despite a growing body of literature on the
Interrelationship between economic and demographic factors, there are
gaps and deficiencies In present knowledge on the topic. The present
situation ls summarized as fol lows in a recent United Nations report:
"Although an integrated theory and empirical approach to the
study of economic-demography ls urgently needed, the current
state of knowledge is neither sufficiently unified or compre
hensive enough to infer with confidence the precise causes of
various demographic events or their consequences of population
trends". 8
6. H. Liebenstein Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, (New
York: John WI ley and Sons, 1957).
7. R.R. Nelson, "A Theory of Low-Level Equi I ibrium Trap in Under
developed Countries", AER, December 1956.
8. United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Pro
grammes in Demographic Aspects of Economic Development, 1970, p. 13.

It has been cu stoma ty ;- c c I i.,ss i f y various mode Is dea I i ng with the
economics-demography issu0 in-ro the broad ca-i·egoric;s of macro economic and
micro economic approaches.

t-1acro economic models study the interaction

between population on one hand and the key rn.:1cr·o economic magnitudes on
the other, such as output, consumption, savings and employment.

One such

macro economic modei in which popuiation plays a central role is the wel I
known Coale and Hoover model, based on indian experience.

9

This model pro

vides a framework by which the econor,1ic impact of lower fertl I ity can be
measured.

The underlying assui;ip"i"ions

o·r

the model ar-e

·that the size of

the labor force rnmained constant during the period under study, the qual
ity of the I abor fo1--ce is not affected by the increased per capita con
sumpt Ion, and only the monotlzed investments are taken into account. The
authors demonstrated that per capita incomes should be expected to increase
in less developed countr;es through iol-'10:-ed fo,·ti I ity, because the "wel
fare expenditures 11 n0c0ssitai·ed by lower· for·ri i ity would al low a larger
portion of the total ou-1-ptr!· to be lnves·,-ed in g.-owth promoting capital
goods and thus st 1mu i ate economic growth.

They shov,ed that for a thirty

year perlod--from 1956 -;-o !936--the pe, capita income of India would grow

by 95 percent with I c•:1 pcpu I at: on groi·:th.
The Coale and Hoove:-- n,0del is cs:---;-aln!y ;:rn lrn;-irovement over the more
simplistic Har-rod-Do~.ni· mc.idc! .vherc gro•.v·l-h in ou-~ptr1· is a function of In
1

vestment on I y, cmd the c-::ird-rl but ion of I at.~ot~ "i'o output is total I y ignored

~A, J. Coa!o <.1nd E. M. Hoover·, Popuia"!-icn Grm1th and Economic
Development in Lmv-income C0ur.rries, (PrTncff:·c:1: F':-inceton University
Press, 1958).
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on the assumption that capital is the only scarce factor and labor is so
abundant that its marginal productivity is zero or near zero. The major
improvement In the Coale and Hoover model is that increases In population
influence the aggregate output through its effect on savings and the pattern
of Investments.

However, the Coale and Hoover model also implies the con

stancy of the capital-output ratio where increases in employment is a
function of the capital invested and thus demographic variables do not
directly Influence output. This is not a real lstic assumption particularly
from the long term growth point o-f view of the economies.
In an attempt to overcome this deficiency, macro economic models have
been constructed on basically neo-classlcal I ines where both capital and
labor are assumed to contribute to the growth of output. A production
function of the Cobb-Douglas type with two factors, capital and labor,
constitute the crux of these models. The increases in output is propor
tionate to a certain power of the capital and labor factors, where the ex
ponents represent the elasticities of productivity of the factor involved.
11'\

S. Enke's recent work is representative of this approach. ,u The model
constructed by Enke includes a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
along with an employment function I inked on one hand with the rate of in
vestment and with the ava i Iab Ie unemp toyed Iabor on the other. The Ieve Is
of net Investments and savings are estimated residually, once the level of
of consumption is determined by the level of income and the population
10. S. Enke, Population Growth and Economic Development: Background
and Guide, Prepared for U.S. AID by Tempo, General Electric's Center for
Advanced Studies, Santa Barbara, California, 1968.
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growth. Then the model is solved under the two separate assumptions of
constant fertility and declining fertility. The solution based on declining fertility results in slower population growth, a significant de
gross

cline in the child-adult ratio, a significant increase in per capita

national product and in total savings by the year 2000, while there Is hardly
any

difference in the absolute level of gross national product.
The major shortcoming s of both of these basically macro economic ap

proaches as represented by the Coale and Hoover and the Enke models stem
from their relatively simplistic, mechanical and one-sided nature.

Macro

eco'nomic models tend to oversimplif y the interrelatio nship between the
economic and demographic factors which is essentially a complex one. They
totally disregard the behavioral aspects of this relationship and concen
trate on the mechanics of how lowered fertility affects the growth in
total output through its impact on consumption, savings and investments ,
assuming that aggregate production functions explain long term growth
prospects for underdeveloped countries.

Hoover suggests that in order to

improve the real ism of these economic-demographic models some measure
of investment in "human capital" and technology should be included in the
production functions along with the inputs of labor and capital as wel I as
attention being paid to the economies of scale resulting from large popu11
1at ion s I ze •
It should also be noted that the present macro economic models pri
marily emphasize only one aspect of the interaction between the demographic
11. E. M. Hoover, "Basic Approaches to the Study of Demographic
Aspects of Economic Development, Economic-Demographic Models", Report
prepared for the U.N. Conference on the Demographic Aspects of Economic
Development, 1970, pp. 9-12.
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and economic variables, nameiy the impact of reduced fert! I ity over the
key macro

~conomlc magnitudes, and often restrict their attention to only

a few variables such as consumption, savings and per capita income. It is
an established fact that human fertl i ity itself is affected by socio
economic factors such as change in income, educational
zation and industrialization.

improvement, urbani

This is actually the point of departure

for the recently popular micrn economic a!Jproach to the economics-demo
graphy phenomenon.
With the so-called micro economic analysis, the reproductive behaviour
of couples In response to changes in the ii- socio economl c environment Is
evaluated. At the same time: -t-he consequences of ferti I ity changes are ex
plored In terms of family con[ump·rion standards, saving patterns and labor
force participation as wol I as how additional population pressure affects
the behaviour of the couples.

A pioneer o-f the micro economic cpprnach was H, Liebenstein.

He dis

cussed the uti I !ty derived from having children and the costs involved in
I ':>

rearing children.''"

Liebenstein identified three types of utilities ac-

crued to the parents, as a r,Jsult of first, a chi Id being a "consumption
good 11 (because 1t is a source of personal pleasur-e), second, "productive
agent", and third, a

11

po-J-eni"ial source of securii"y 11 •

On the other hand he

separated the cost of having an addltion,11 chi Id into direct and indirect
costs; direct cos-rs being -:-h3 "conventional expenses 11 of maintaining the

12.

H. Leibenstein, 9p_. cit., p, 16 ! .

chi Id and indirect costs referring to the "opportunit ies foregone" by
having an additional chi Id.

Leibenstein maintained that the correlation

between the level of income and the utility derived from an additional
child as a productive agent and a potential source of security was negative
while the relationship between hcome level and satisfaction from ~hi ldren
was indetermina te.

Regarding cost, he suggested that both direct and

indirect costs of raising children increased as per capita income increased.
In 1960, G. Beck,.3r applied the conventiona l economic theory of con
sumer behavior in a rigorous fashion to the ferti I ity behavior of the
households.

13

According to Becker, lithe theory of the demand for the con-

11
sumer durables is a use-ful framewcrk in analyzing the demand for chi ldren

since children provide "uti I ityn as consumer durables.

Like other consumer

durables, some children are of "higher· quaiity", not because they are
superior but because -;-he amount of money spent on them is relatively higher.
Becker maintains tha-t since children are n:)t inferior goods, the demand
theory te I Is us that an increase in i nco~.19 shou Id increase both the quanti -

ty and the qua I i ty of chi I dren demanded.

He thinks that U e berste in erred

when he said that the cost of children rises as the parents' income increases.
According to Becker an increase in expenditure on children does not
necessarily mean a rise in the cost of c~i ldren, but it means that parents
prefer "higher qua I i ty" chi l d ren.

It is not the cost but the qua Ii ty

children that goes up as income increases.

of

As far as the supply of children

G. Becker, 11 An Ecoi1omic Analysls of Ferti I ity", in Demoqraphlc
and Economic Change in Developed Countries, P, Conference of the Univer
sities-Nati ona i Bureau Commii"t•33 for· Economic Resear·ch, (Princeton: Prince
ton Univ. Press, i960) pp. 209-231 ..
13.
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is concerned, Becker-argued that fami I ies tend to have "excess children"
because of a lack of contraceptive knowledge. Given perfect knowledge of
contraception, couples would choose to have a number of children based on
the same principles that apply to the theory of demand tor consumer
durables.
R. Easterlin, in a 1969 article, continued where Becker left off and
argued that "tertl I ity behavior is the result of household choices, in
14 He suggested that
which resources are weighed against preferences".
Income, tastes and prices are the bui Iding blocks of the study of the
household behavior, and maintained that the "permanent income" concept
is more pertinent to household decision-making than the observed income
at a given time. The term permanent income is also defined as the potential
income of the household. Given the potential income of a family, what de
termines the demand tor children, he says, is the "structure of preferences"
regarding goods, chi idren, leisure and fertll lty control practice.

On the

other hand, experience, and past and current environment are instrumental
in shaping the structure of preferences.

Easterlin suggests that a third

relevant factor, after permanent income and the structure of preferences
is the various "price constraints", such as the prices of chi Id care and
of ferti Iity control methods relative to the prices of other goods.
Easterlin does not agree with Becker's explanation of how the lack of
contraceptive knowledge affects the supply of children.

According to

14. R. Easter I in, "Toward a Socio-Economic Theory of Ferti I ity:
Survey of Recent Research on Economic Factors in American Ferti I ity",
in S. J. Behrman et al, eds., 2£..· cit., pp. 127-156.

A

Easterlin the couples weigh the disuti lity of having an unwanted child
against the cost involved infertility control, including the subjec
tive cost.

On account of this consideration the modern contraceptive

methods are more attractive than the traditional ones, not only because
they are more efficient but also because their subjective cost is con
siderably lower.
These pioneering works on the theory of fertil lty behavior have stimu
lated empirical studies exploring the relationship between economic and
social variables, and demographic variables.

In some studies the relation

ship between fertility and various measures of income was investigated.
In one such study, D.S. Freedman found that potential Income was more in
15 R. Freedman and L. Coombs
fluential on fertility than current income.
showed that increases in income might encourage the demand for children,
but "other reasons for not having children also increase with higher
16 J. Blake showed that as the money income increased,
economic status".
17
The findings
the "indirect costs" of raising children also increased.
of these studies generally supported the view that rising incomes en
couraged fertility but at the same time increases in the cost of raising
children adversely affected ferti iity.
As the foregoing shows, theoretical models and empirical studies
of micro economic nature gained prominence during the last decade. These
15. D.S. Freedman, "The Relation of Economic Status to Fertility",
AER, June 1963.
16. R. Freedman and L. Coombs, "Economic Considerations in Faml ly
Growth Decisions", Population Studies, Nov. 1966, p. 213.
17. J. Blake, "Income and Reproductive Motivation", Population
Studies, 1967.
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studies approach the populatio n problem at the family level and attempt to
determine the impact of economic variables on the ferti I ity behavior of
the married couples. They represent important strides forward in the state
of knowledge in this field compared to ten years ago.

Neverthel ess a

number of questions remain unanswered or not sufficien tly explored.

One

such area is the lack of comprehensive models bridging the gap between
the macro and the micro approache s.

The incorpora tion of the micro

findings with the macro models would increase the realism of these models
considera bly.
Secondly there has been a heavy reliance on purely economic factors
in these studies. As shown in the examples above, the relations hip between
income and fertility has been the center of attention .

However, social

factors may be equa I Iy important in the determina tion of fert i I i ty be
havior. Even though factors such as education , urbanizat ion, industria li
zation are often cited as relevent in the fertility discussio ns, their
ful I impact has not so far- been properly dealt with. A much needed com
prehensiv e approach would require the recognitio n of these factors alto
gether.
Thirdly, the present theoretic al models have been developed to ex
plain the populatio n phenomenon in the [ndusi"ria !ized countries . Within
this framework the treatment of children as consumer durables is appealing .
But for a theory of fert i I ity behavior tc have uni versa I va I ue, it must
take into account the socio economic condition s prevailin g In the under
developed countries .

Liebenste in 1 s eot-1 ier contribut ion that children are

not only consumer durables, but also productiv e agents and potential sources
of security is certainly relevant In poor countries .
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A simi tar criticism also applies to the empirical studies carried
out on this subject. These studies are often based on the experience and
data of the industrialized Western countries. Thus the applicability of
the findings of these studies is very limited. The paucity of reliable
data Is certainly the major factor contributing to the lack of similar
studies for the underdeveloped countries. Studies of this nature require
the availability of detailed Information on a number of variables and with
the exception of

a

few countries this Is not possible at present

But it

is in these very countries that the need for an understanding of fertility
behavior is most urgent so that appropriate policies can be'brmulated
and implemented.
The fol lowing explores the socio-economics of fertility within the
Turkish context.

Needless to say, the analysis Is constrained by the

limited data in many instances. Pt this stage, however, it would be appro
priate to give some information on the socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of the Turkish population.

Ill.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DE~OGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
Turkey has a population of 35.7 mi II ion according to the preliminary

results of the 1970 census. Turkey's population grew at an annual rate of
25.5 per thousand during the 1965-70 period. The rate of population growth
has fluctuated in the past; from nearly 2 percent in 1935-40, it dropped
to almost I percent during the Second World War years, but due to rapid
lowering of mortality immediately after the War, growth rates jumped to
2.2 percent in 1945-50, to 2.8 in 1950-55 and 2.9 percent in 1955-60 before
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it slowed down around 2.5 percent in the 1960-65 period. The lower growth
rates in the sixties are not attributable to the slowing down of the fertl 1ity.

It is the result of the changes in the age distribution of the

popula~on--i.e., women entering the chi Id bearing age who were born in the
low growth rate period of 1940-45--and migration due to increased job op
portunities in Western Europe.
The characteristics of Turkey's population are summarized in Table
based on the results of the Turkish Demographic Survey 1966-67. 18 The
figures given are both for Turkey as a whole and for rural and urban popu
lations separately.

As the data in Table I reveals, there is a marked

difference in size between the rural and urban populations In most cate
gories. At present, more than 65 percent of the Turkish people live fn
scattered vi I Iage-type settlements or in smal I towns, and the remaining
35 percent live in towns and the cities with a population of 2,000 or more.
The population of the cities increased by more than 5 percent annually
throughout the i960 1 s. This, has not been the result of a higher birth
rate in the cities, bu
the cities.

rather because of migration from the vii !ages to

Along with the phenomenon of city-bound migration, there has

also been an east to west movement of population in Turkey. Despite com
paratively lower birth rates in the Western provinces, more than two thirds
of the Turkish population live in the Western part of the country, where
the soi I is more fertile and the level of inaustrial ization is· higher.

18. Vital Statistics from the Turkish Demographic Survey, 1966-67,
School of Public Health, Ankara, 1970.
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Table I
Vital Statistics for Turkey
Turkev

Rural

Urban

Age Groups (percentage)
42.5
53.3
4.2

39.7
51.9
4.1

39.7
56.2
4.1

87.6

92.7

77. 9

78.3
18.9

80.0
18.2

75.2
20.5

21.2
18. 3

20.2
18.3

22.9
18.5

22.8

22.2

24.0

Crude Birth Rates (per thousand) 39.6
11
14. 6
"
Crude Death Rates
25. 0
n
"
Natura I Increase

43.9

31.4

16.7
27.2

10.7
20.7

0-14
15-64
65+
Dependency Ratio (percentage)
Proportion of Married Women
(15-64) (percentage)
Median Age
Medi an Age at Fi rst Marr· i age
Male
Female
Women of Childbearing Age
(15-49) (percentage)

Total Fertility

5.30

6.12

3.88

Gross Reproduction Rates

2.62

3.01

1.94

Mean Childbearing Age

29.3

29.7

28.4

Chi Id-Woman Ratio (percentage)

71 .3

77.3

60.8

14.6
18.7
20.3

16.1
20.9
22.6

14.7
16. I

54.9

52.8

58.6

Chi Id Mortality (percentage)
Ages

0-1
0-5
0-15

Expectation of I ife at Birth
Source:

Turkish Demographic Survey 1966-67.

II. 9
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One str·iking, though not surprising characteristic of the Turkish
population is -rhe high percentage of children. Children under 15 consti
tute some 42.5 percent of the total populati"on. according to the Turkish
Demographic Survey, as shown In Tab I e I. As a resu It of higher popu I at! on
growth rates in recent decades, the share of this young age group has re
latively increased. Acco1-ding to the census results in 1945, it was 39.5
percent, in 1950 38.3 per·cent, in 1955 39.4 percent, In 1960 41.3 percent
and in 1965 it was 41.7 percent. Such an age distribution, despite the
low percentage of· those over 65 resu I ts in high dependency ratios; It is
defined as the ratio between the non-working age and working age popula
tions and is 87,6 pe:-ceni- for Turkey.

The difference between the dependency

ratios for rural nnd urban areas is also significant, it being as high as

92.7 percent in rural vi I I ages against 77.9 percent for the cities.
There are also dif-ferences between the rural and urban areas in terms
of the median age, proportion of married women and median age at first
marriage, as shown in Table lo Both the median age as a whole and the
median age at first marriage for ma I es and fema I es are I ewer for the rura I
areas compared with the cities.

On the other hand, the proportion

of

married women Is higher in the vi I I ages.
It is a I so revea I ed in Tab I e I, that tlB crude birth rates for the
whole country is nearly 40 per thouscnd, and the crude death rates are
around 15 per thousand.
reach
years.

t-h0 age -:,f one,

Nearly 150 out of 1000 children die before they
E>~pectation of I ife at birth is approximately 55
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Total fertl lity rate, define d as the total number of childr en that
would ever be born to an average woman throughout her reprod uctive life-
between the ages of 15 and 49--is 5.3.

The rate varies between 6.82 for

the rural and 3.88 for the urban popul ations .

On the other hand, the gross

in
reprod uction rate, which is the number of girls to an average woman
her reprod uctive ages, is 2.62 for Turkey.
According to the 1965 census , only 48.7 percen t of the Turkis h popu
lation over 6 years of age ls litera te. The literac y level for the male
populaTion was 64 percen t as again st 32.8 percen t literac y for the female
popul ation. There is an apprec iable difter ence between the city and
t for
vii lage litera cy levels ; 66,9 percen t for the cities and 38.5 percen
y
the villag es. Provinces also differ signif icantl y in terms of I iterac
te
levels . For example while some 77.3 percen t of the people are litera
In the provin ce of Istanb ul, only 17,6 percen t are litera te In the South
Easter n provin ce of Hakkari.
Those who graduated from at least a five-y ear primary school are
approximately 35 percen t of the popula tion eleven years old or over.
at
Some 83 percen t of primary school age childr en are attend ing schoo ls
presen t, but the ratio drops to abouT 25 percen t at the secondary level.
The presen t size of the labor supply is approximately 15 mil lion in
Turkey, and is growing at a rate of 3 percen t annua lly. According to
figure s given by the State Planning Organ lzation
19.

19 only 13.2 ml I lion or

1971 Annual Programme, Offtct at Gazet te, Table 426.
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88 percent of these are domestica lly employed. Another 500,000 work abroad

mainly In West Germany. Some 68 percent of the domestica lly employed labor
is engaged in agricultu ral activitie s, about I I percent work in

industry,

and the remaining 21 percent find employment in construct ion and in various
services.
Per capita gross national product of Turkey was 230 U.S. dollars in
1970 at the official rate of exchange. The same year,some 30 percent of

the net domestic income originate d from agricultu re, while the share of
industry and services stood at 20 and 50 percent respectiv ely.

Marked

dispariti es exist in personal and regional income distribut ion. According
to a study conducted by the State Planning Organiza tion, in 1963, 20 per
cent of the families which made up the lowest income group had a 4.5
percent share of the national income, while the share of the highest
20 percent income group was as high as 57 percent.

Looking at it from a

different angle, per family income was 278 dollars for the first group and
20 On the other hand the level of
3.544 dollars for the latter group.
living is markedly different between the large cities and rural areas,
as well as between the Western and Eastern provinces . For example, per
capita income of Istanbul province is more than eight times as high as
Blng81 province in Eastern Anatolia.

20. Second Five Year Development Plan 1968-72, State Planning
Organiza tion, Ankara 1968, p. 63.
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IV.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The multivariat e analysis has been widely used in studies exploring

and measuring the impact of various socio economic variables on the fer
tility behavior of families.

In these studies the dependent variable is a

certain measure of fertility (i.e. total fertility, gross reproduction
rate or the chi Id-woman ratio) and the independent variables are those
factors that are expected to influence the fertl lity behavior, such as
level of income, industrial lzation, education, and urbanizatio n.
Depending on the nature of the analysis both time series and cross
section analysis can be employed in these studies. The advantage of the
time series analysis originates from the dynamic nature of the problem.
One of the more important questions in the fertility analysis is how the
changes in the socio-econo mic mi lieu affect the fertility behavior of
the families.

However, such an analysis requires data for a number of

variables over an extended period of time.

It

Is generally very

difficult to obtain consistent and reliable time series data for these
variables, particuiari y in the iess deveioped countries.
It is relatively easier to gather data for cross-sectio n analysis.
With this approach data is collected for· a number of variables for a
number of countries or for different regions of a given country for a
given year, with a view to measure the impact of these factors on fertil
ity.

Exclusion of certain variables describing the differences in re

ligions, cultural heritage, and values in different countries may ad
versely affect the realism of studies that draw on the experience of a

-22-

large number of countries .

However, this problem becomes much less

formidabl e in the cross-reg ional or provincia l studies in a single
country, since the populatio n is usually more homogeneous from the cul
tural point of view.
The present study is an applicatio n of the cross-sec tion analysis to
the Turkish data, with the purpose of exploring the significa nce of a num
ber of socio-eco nomic variables In the determina tion of fertility behavior.
Originall y data was collected on 16 variables for the 67 provinces of
Turkey for the year 1965.

The year 1965 was chosen because this was the

most recent populatio n census year for which detailed informatio n was
available . After a number of trial runs the 16 independe nt variables were
reduced to 7 in the final analysis.
Two multiple regressio n problems have been worked out.

In the first

problem the total fertility and in the second problem the child-woman
ratio was taken as the dependent variables , and all other variables were
treated as the independe nt variables .

The reason why the total fertility

ls chosen as the dependent variable is self-expl anatory. The child-woman
ratio is also considere d an adequate measure of the fertility behavior of
21
couples •
For the solution of the two multiple regressio n problems, the computer
program of Stepwise Regressio n was employed. The mechanics of this program
has been explained in the general descriptio n:
21, The generally accepted definitio n of the chi Id-woman ratio is
the ratio between children ages Oto 5, and women 15-45 age group. However,
in this study the 0-9 age group children has been used instead for the
group, on account of greater age misreport ing for the group in
0-5
the Turkish censuses.
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"This program computes a sequence of multiple I inear regression
equations in a stepwise manner. At each step one variable ls added
to the regression equation. The variable added is the one which
makes the greatest reduction in the error sum of squares. Equiva
lently, it ls the variable which has highest partial correlation
with the dependent variable partialed on the variables which have
already been added; and equivalently it is the variable which, If
it were added, would have the highest F value. 1122
The preliminary runs in the computer employing various combinations
of variables have revealed that regression equation in the logarithmic
form with the following independent variables produced the highest co
efficient of determination (RSQ) and more consistent regression coefficients.

23
where Y is either the total ferti lity or the chi Id-woman ratio

24

,

x 1 is

the education variable (the level of I iteracy or the ratio of female prl25 x is the relative distance from two Western promary school graduates
2

vinces26 (istanbui or izmir}, x is the ievei of urbanization indicating
3
the ratio of those living in cities with more than 50,000 population to the
27 x is the level of industrialization as
total population of the province,
4
22. W. J. Dixon, BMD Biomedical Computer Programs, Univ. of Cali
fornia Press, 1968, p. 233.
23. Total fertility rates have been estimated Independently by F.C.
Shorter of Princeton University, Office of Population Research.
24.

1965 Population Census of Turkey

25.

Ibid

26.

Highway Map of Turkey, Turkey's Highways General Directorate

27.

1965 Population Census of Turkey
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28 x
5
ls the level of socio-ec onomic developmen-r as indicate d by a composi te
30 and x .1s
.
. dex, 29 X .1s t he populati.on density
per square kl. lometer,
1n
7
6
31
.
th e per cap1·t a income.
indicate d by the ratio of industri al labor to the total employment,

The results of the solution of the two regressi on problems are shown
in terms of four problem s.

In the two solution s of the first problem the

depende nt vari ab Ie is the total fert i I i ty, and the educatio n vari ab Ies
are first the level of literGcy and second the ratio of female primary
In the two so Iut ions of the second prob i em the dependent

schoo I gradua·res.

variable Is the chi Id-woman ratio, and ·rhe two educatio nal variable s are
as explaine d above.
Before analyzin g the results ot this study, a few general observa tions
should be made.

In al I four probiems the coeffici ent of determin ation

<RSQ) is very high and si·atisti cal ly signific ant. The lowest value of RSQ
is 0.760 for problem #3 and the highest value is 0.847 for problem #2.
On the other hand the educatio nal variable s (level of I iteracy and the
ratio of female prirrnry school graduate s) singleha ndedly explain between
63 and 72 percent of the variance in the tot a I fert i I i ty and the chi Id28.

Ibid

29. Socio-Economic Developmont lnde~< for Turkey on a Provinc ial
Basis, State Planning Organiz ation, June 1970 (mlmeo)
30.

1965 Populati on C0nsus of Turk0y

31. T. Bulutay and H. Ersel, Turi-dye Milli Gelirini n Iller, lmalat
Sanayii Gelirini n Ucret ve Kar Arasinda B81Unusll f.'2::erine Bir Deneme,
Journal of Politica l Science s Faculty, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1970.
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Table 2.

Ferti I ity Regress ions

A. Level of Literacy as Education Variable
Coefficient

Standard
Error

t Value

RSQ

Increase
in RSQ

Constant

2.698

Literacy

-0.283

0.073

3.877

0.643

0.643

Distance

0.062

0.013

4.769

0.786

0.143

-0.123

0.051

2.411

0.796

0.010

0.012

0.005

2.400

0.819

0.023

-0.031

0.040

o. 775

0.821

0.002

Socio-Economic Development

0.047

o. 114

0.412

0.822

0.001

Per capita income

0.017

0.087

o. 195

0.822

0.000

Industrialization
Urbanization
Density

B.

Female Primary School Graduates as Education Variable

Constant

2.115

Graduates

-o. 170

0.032

5.313

0.697

0.697

Distance

0.054

0.01 I

4.909

0.810

o. 113

Density

-0.059

0.034

I. 735

0.824

0.014

0.010

0.005

2.000

0.833

0.009

-0.110

0.046

2.391

0.843

0.010

0.098

0.081

1.209

0.847

0.004

Urbanization
Industrialization
Socio-Economic
Development
Per Capita Income *

*F

level insufficient for inclusion

-26Table 3.

A.

Chi Id-Woman Ratio Regressions

Level of Literary as Education Variable
Coefficient

Standard
Error

t Value

RSQ

Increase
in RSQ

Constant

1.124

Literacy

-0.228

0.059

3.864

0.611

0.611

Distance

0.047

0.01 I

4.272

0.739

0.128

Urbanization

0.006

0.004

1.500

0.743

0.004

-0.076

0.041

1.854

0.755

0.012

Density

0.013

0.033

0.394

0.758

0.003

Socio-Economic
Development

0.076

0.093

0.817

0.759

0.001

-0.036

0.071

0.507

0.760

0.001

Industrialization

Per capita income
8.

Female Primary School Graduates as Education Variable

Constant

0.676

Graduates

-0.140

0.026

5.384

0.686

0.686

Distance

0.039

0.010

3.900

0.780

0.094

Urbanization

0.004

0.004

1.000

0.784

0.004

-0.064

0.038

1,684

0.790

0.006

0.124

0.086

1.441

0.795

0.005

Per capita Income

-0.054

0.066

0.818

0.797

0.002

Density

-0.012

0.031

0.387

0.798

0.001

Industrialization
Socio-Economic
Development
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woman ratios.

32

The regression coefficients and the standard error of es

timates are given in Column I and Column 2 of Tables 2 and 3 respectively.
The resultant values are shown in Column 3, and indicate that only less
than fifty percent of the coefficients are statistically significant at
the five percent level.

It should also be noted that with the exception

of per capita income and density variables, the t-values are relatively
high.
V.

MAJOR FINDINGS

A.

Income and Fertility
In any study of fertility, the impact of the level of or the increase

in per capita income on fertility occupies central importance. The
theoretical discussions centering around the influence of income on fertil
ity behavior of couples have already been summarlezed and the findings
of some of the empirical research, mostly based on the experience of the
industrialized societies have been discussed. Research in underdeveloped
countries on fert!!lty-lncome issue is scarce, due to the unava!!ability
and the unreliability of the data.
Those who have attempted to explore the Influence of the level of
income on fertility behavior in less developed countries are quick to
admit the difficulty involved in separating the partial effects of income
changes from the overal I effects.

In realityg detailed family income

32. In order1o verify the strength of educational variables, trial
runs were made removing the educational variables. In all cases the
distance variable became the most significant explanatory variable, but
the value of coefficient of determination dropped to below 70 percent.
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statistic s are necessary before the partial impact of income on fer
tility can be measured with accuracy.

Jn some studies, including the

present one, other variables such as education appear to be more signifi
cant than income in affecting the fert i I ity.

However, it is wide Iy ac

cepted that the absolute level and the rate of growth of income is highly
correlate d with the so-cal led moderniza tion variables such as education
and urbanizat ion, and the level of Income contribut es to the Improvement
of the factors that are instrumen tal In lowering the fertility rates.
In a cross section regressio n analysis covering 37 countries I.
Adelman found that the partial effect of Income on fertility was consis
33 A simi tar conclusio n was reached
tently positive, for al I age groups.
by R. Weintraub.

34

J. L. Simon after analyzing the results of these two

studies and comparing them with the experienc e of industria lized coun
tries, maintains that partial regressio n results are not relevant and
what ls important is what
on ferti I ity.

he cal Is the lluncondit ional effect" of income

He maintains that

11

in underdeveloped countries the uncon

ditional effect of income on fertility is negative, even though its par
tial effect (after abstractin g from other operative variables ) may well be
35
positlve.
33. I • Ade Iman, "An Econometric Ana I ys is of Popu Iat ion Growth",
AER, June 1963, p. 320.
34. R. Weintraub , 11The Birth Rate and Economic Development: An
Emp i r i ca I Study", Econometrica, Oct. I 962.
35. J. L. Simon, "The Effect of Income on Fertility ", Populatio n
Studies, Nov. I969, p. 334.
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Our analysis is inconclusive with regard to the partial effect of in
come on the fertility pattern in Turkey. The regression coefficients are
not significant at al I and the income elasticity is very low. What adds to
the state of indeterminancy is the fact that the sign of the partial re
gression coefficient is once positive and once has an F value too low for
inclusion in the analysis, when the total fertility rate is taken as the
dependent variable, and it is negative when the chi Id-woman ratio replaces
the fertl lity variable.

However in most of the trial runs the sign of the

coefficient was positive. Thus in looking at the results one
conclusion that the partial impact of per capita

reaches the

income differentials in

Turkey Is not significant in any v1ay.
In the study of the relationship between the level of income and
fertility the distribution of income vdthin each province is also very
important. Given the mechanical estimates for per capita incomes, the In
come level of the bulk of the people in certain provinces may be consider
ably lower than the per capita figure indicates, due to highly unequal
income distribution.

The income distribution problem, however, could not

be taken into account in this study.
It Is also important to note here that even though the partial im
pact of income proves to be insignificant, per capita income level is high
ly correlated with some modernization variables, indicating the overall
strong impact. For example the correlation coefficient between the per
capita Income and the literacy level is 66 percent, with female .primary
school graduates it is 73 percent, and with industrialization is 88 per
cent.
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B. Education and Fertility
The negative correlation between the level of education and ferti llty
has been evidenced in the studies based on data both in underdeveloped and
developed countries. For example, I. Adelman found that for al I age groups
in underdeveloped countries the regression coefficient of birth rates with
3
respect to education was always negative ~ Asimilar result was reached
by K. Dandekar in a study based on data for forty nine underdeveloped coun
tries.

According to the results of a National Sample Survey in India, ap

proximately 60 percent of i II iterate married people knew about contracep
This ratio was 78 percent among the primary school graduates and 96
37
percent for the university graduates . R. 8. Hughes found the same nega38
The relatively high
tive correlation between fertility and education.

tion.

correlation coefficient found In these studies supports the thesis that
education depresses fertility levels.
The repre=sive influence of education on fertility may be explained by
at least four factors.

One of them is that literacy and education help

people learn about contraception.

This point seems to be particuiariy re

levant in the less developed countries.

In more advanced countries where

the level of I iteracy is 90 percent or moree:lucation may not be a signifi
cant factor as far as knowledge of contraception is concerned.
36.

But in

I • Ade Iman, QQ.. cit. , p. 322.

37. K. Dandekar, "Effect of Education on Ferti I ity", in United
Nations, World Population Conference. 1965, New York 1967, p. 149.
38. R. 8. Hughes, "Human Ferti Iity Differentials: The influence of
Industrial-Urban Development on Birth Rates", Population Review, July
1959, p. 62.
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underdeveloped countries with very high i I literate masses it is not un
realistic to expect that lack of knowledge can conceivably be a factor
contributing to high fertility.
The relationship between education and the knowledge of contraception
may also be looked at from a different angle.

As discussed, Becker ar-

gued that the reason the number of children in a family differed from the
preferred number was because couples lacked contraceptive knowledge. But
R. Easterlin maintained that this was too simple an explanation and that
for a complete analysis of ferti I ity behavior, the pr-eduction of another
good--namely coitus--must be introduced into the analysis. Thus he says that
couples consider the loss of uti I ity attributable to the possibi I ity of
an unwanted birth against the uti Iity lost by using contraceptive methods.
One can conclude

from this that even when one assumes the masses have

contraceptive knowledge, education increases the opportunities for a more
effective use of it while lowering the subjective cost of fertility con
trol.
A second way education adversely affects fertility is that education
may provide opportunities, particularly for women, that conflict with
chi Id rearing.

This is probably true for both developed and underdeveloped

countries. Women with education have a wider opportunity to be gainfully
employed outside the home, and in societies

where chi Id-care facilities

are either inadequate or non-existent chi Id rearing becomes an obstacle
for economic advancement.
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A third effect of education on fertility can be explained in terms of
the general effects of education on human beings. Education provides a
new outlook towards the world ,and makes people more conscious of his
surroundi ngs and opportun ities.

It makes them more .rational and trees

them from tradition .
A fourth factor may be the increasing cost of chi Id-rearing with
education al level of parents. Even though the cost of children of similar
quality is not different for educated and uneducated couples, as Becker
pointed out in the discussio n of income level and the cost of children, it
Is true that the educated couple may want children of higher quality with:
better education . Thus the high cost of rearing children may also be a
depressin g factor on ferti I ity among educated people"
It is not surprisin g that the findings of the present study coincide
with the general opinion that education is negativel y correlate d with
fertility .

But the results are rather overwhelming, Both I iteracy and

female primary school graduates score very high in the analysis.

In al I

cases the sign of the education regressio n coefficie nt is negative. The
coefficie nts are always statistic ally significa nt at five percent level.
And the elasticit ies are relativel y high.

But more important ly, in al I

cases education explains more than 65 percent of the variance in the de
pendent variable, and the remaining factors combined explain approxim ately
15 percent of the variance.

Al I these strongly suggest that the relation

ship between education and fertility is a causal one. It is also interestin g
to observe that the female primary school graduate variable seems to be
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more important than the Ii ter-acy var i ab I e in exp I a in i ng the variance in
fert i I i ty, indicating the rn ie of forma 1 education.

On the other hand

when the female primary school graduates variable is replaced by the male
primary school graduate ratio as the educational vai-lable, the RSQ drops
significantly.

This suggests that the female education is more important

than male education in lowedng the ferti ! ity rate.
In a study of the re I at i onsh i p between \I/omen's eciucat ion and fert i 1i ty, S. Timur found that average I ive births for i I! iterate women in Tur
key was 4.2 while I iterate women without formal education had on the
average 3.2 children, women 11/i-th prirr:ury schooi education had 2.8, with
secondary education 2.0 and those wlth university ec!ucation had 1.4
children.

However she also found that husbandis education influenced fer

ti I ity in a much less effective way and a break ln ferti I ity occurred
I eve I o f sc hoo I .I ng. 39
-'
on I y at th e seconaary
The Turkish Demographic Survey revea!ed -;-hat birth rates varied ac
cording to the education of the women. For example ln the most fertile
age group, 20-24, the bi r-th rate among l ; I iterate women is 305 per thousand
whereas the birth rate stands

at 235 pet thousand among the primary school

graduates, and I 13 per thousand for the middie school graduates.

40

39. S. Timur, "Socio-Economic Determinants o-f Differential Ferti I lty in Turkey", lr.stituie cf Population Studies, Hacettepe University,
Ankara, 1971, pp. il,14. (Mlmeo).
40.

Turkish Demographic Survey, op. cit.

pp. 51, 54.
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C.

Urbanization, Population Density and Fertility
Data from a large number of countries suggest that urban fertility

rates are generally lower than rural fertility rates in both developed
and underdeveloped countries.

According to the Turkish Demographic Sur

vey, the total fertility rate for urban Turkey (population 2,000 or more)
was 3.88 and for rural Turkey 6. 12 for the survey period of 1966-67.

Simi

larly the crude birth rates also differed significantly in the cities and
the vi I !ages, birth rates being 3.14 for urban and 4.39 for rural Turkey.
A number of reasons have been given for the fertility differentials in
the urban and rural populations,

It has been argued that urban settings

provide more economic opportunity and social freedom for women.
cities, women are generally less dependent on men.

In the

It has also been argued

that the cost of raising children is higher in the cities and people often
consider cities a poor place to raise children. The addition of another
ch 11 d to the fami ! y in rura I areas does not increase the space requirements
and various expenditures in the same proportion as it does in cities.

And

the value of children as productive agents is considerably less in the
cities. Children help the families as labor from very early ages on farms
whereas the opportunity to use them for any kind of labor is I lttle in
the cities even in the poorest countries .
In this analysis the level of urbanization is defined as the ratio be
tween the number of peopie living in cities with 50,000 population or more
and the total population in a province.

Other criteria for the level of

urbanization have also been used in order to test the impact of urbanization
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on ferti llty.

The level of urbaniza tion variable s estimate d on the basis

of 2,000, 10,000 and 20,000 populati on or more produced statisti cally less
signific ant coeffic ients and contribu ted lower values to the RSQ.
Al I urbaniz ation variable s including the one used in the final analysis
gave coeffic ients with relative ly low values and with positive signs Indi
cating that the level of fertilit y is very I ittle affected by urbaniz ation,
and whateve r effect urbaniza tion had on fertilit y, it was positive ly corre
lated.

This is contrary to the widely held belief that urbaniza tion con

tributes to the lowering of the ferti I ity.

However, what Is observed

here may be regarded as a tempora ry phenomenon. In Turkey, as in many other
underdev eloped countrie s, migratio n from the rural areas to the cities
gained momentum during the last two decades. Rapid increase s in the birth
rate have put a heavy strain on the already I imited resource s and oppor
tunities in the vii lages while increase d use of machinery in the farmland
has displace d men.

Those who move to the cities often live in squatte r

settlem ents, without socially mixing with the city dwellers . In such a
setting they adhere to the values, practice s and outlook towards I ife
which they brought from their rural background.

It would be realisti c to

expect that as the time passes, the offsprin g of this generati on, par
ticularl y with the aid of educatio n, wi II have differen t values and dif
ferent behavio ral patterns , includin g fertilit y behavio r.
S. Timur also reached a similar conclusi on with a
data on Turkey.

differen t set of

She says that the city-war d migratio n did not Induce
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lower fertility unless it was accompanied by a move towards higher socio
.
t at us. 41
economics

The impact of population density on fertility has also been explored.
Two considerations led to the inclusion of the density variables in this
analysis. Firstly, it has been suggested elsewhere 42 that the popula
tion-resource ratio may exert some pressure on reproductive behavior.
Admittedly population density may not reflect the actual resource availa
bil !ties,

but density is a close approximation particularly for countries

like Turkey where more than 70 percent of the people derive their livel i
hood from the land. Secondly, population density in a given province is
an indicatior of how close the communities are geographically and shows
the degree of possible social mobi I lty and contact.
In this analysis the density coefficients in all four problems have
had low values with relatively high standard errors.

However, the density

variable was negatively associated with fertility and child-woman ratios
in three of the four problems. Thus, even though ferti llty Is slightly
higher in provinces with a high level of urbanization, it is generally
lower in more densely populated provinces.

One or both of the above men

tioned factors ought to be instrumental in explaining why fertility is
lower in more densely populated areas.

41.

S. Timur,

42.

I. Adelman,

QQ_.

cit., pp. 9-10.

2Q.•

cit., p. 318.
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O.

Industrializ ation and Fertility
In the Western·cou ntries' experience, industrializ ation, urbaniza

tion, and lowering of the ferti I ity al I coincide with each other. This led
many to expect the same pattern would repeat for the underdevelo ped coun
tries.

As these countries are more industrializ ed and more urbanized

societies the birth rates were expected to rapidly fal I.

This analysis,

however, reveals that even tor a transitiona l period, the type of urbani
zation taking place in Turkey does not lead to an immediate decline in
fertility, as already mentioned.
As a measure of industrializ ation, the ratio of industrial labor to
the total labor force was taken.

In al I four problems the sign of the

coefficient of the industrializ ation variable is negative and the t value
is around two.
lower fertility.

This suggests that industrializ ation is associated with
In a different problem the industrializ ation variable was

replaced by another variable expressing the ratio of non-agricul tural
labor to total employment. The sign of the coefficient became positive and
the coefficient itself became very insignifica nt.

This reinforces the

result arrived at with the urbanizatio n variable. That is very large por
tion of the non-agricul tural labor force is made up of city dwellers who
recently migrated from the vi 11 ages, and participate in service-orie nted
activities.
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E.

Distanc e from the West
There is a marked differe nce in the level of I iving between the Eas

tern and Western provinc es of Turkey.

In the East, which is less densely

popula ted, per capita income, level of I iteracy , level of urbani zation,
and per capita industr ial output are conside rably lower compared with the
Western part of the country . The existin g regiona l dispar ities also have
been recogni zed by the government, and reducin g the regiona l gap became
an explic it officia l tar§et of Turkey 's five year plans.
On the other hand fertili ty differe ntials are also eviden t in these
differe nt regions of the country .

According to the results of the Turkish

Demographic Survey, crude birth rates in 18 Eastern provinc es average d
49.7 per thousan d in rural areas and 47.9 in urban centers , whereas-the
corresp onding ratios for 14 Western provinc es were 35.6 and 26.5 per
thousan d respec tively.

Obviou sly the lower fertili ty in the Western pro

vinces is connec ted with the higher level of literac y and educati on as
wel I as higher level of indust rializa tion, income and urbaniz ation in a
direct or indirec t way.

Nevert heless, there could be anothe r factor not

covered by the above consid eration s, that might influen ce fertili ty be
havior . After all, the popula tion of Western provinc es of Turkey have
traditi onally been in contac t with the European popula tions and have been
more strong ly influen ced by the values prevail ing in these societ ies.
These observ ations sugges t the need for the inclusi on of a factor, called
the distanc e variab le for practic al purpos es, represe nting the relativ e
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distance for. each province from either Istanbul or lzmir--whicheve r is
shorter--the two large western cities traditionally cultural and commer
cial centers.
The analysis showed that the distance variable proved to be an impor
tant one explaining the variance in the dependent variable, only second
to the education variable.

Also in al I four problems the distance coeffic

ient was significant at 5 percent level.

Nevertheless, the value of the

coefficients were smal I indicating the relatively low partial impact of
the distance. As expected, in al I problems it was obvious that the fer
tility and chi Id-woman ratios were positively correlated with the value
of the distance variable. That is, the longer the distance from Istanbul
or Izmir the higher the ferti llty was.

F.

Socio-Economic Development and Fertl lity
At the time the present study was being conducted, a "synthetic" In

dex of the level of socio-economic development of the provinces of Turkey
43 inciuded in this index were 22 variabies grouped undei
was pubiished.
four headings. The first group of variables described the level of indus
trialization, the second group urbanization and organization, third group
modernization in agriculture, and the fourth group the quantity of ser
vices. Accordingly each province assumed an index value, based on a value
of 100 for Turkey.

In this index, the province ranking at the bottom of

the list assumed a value of 35 while the value attached to the province
at the top of the list was 377.
43.

Socio Economic Development Index for Turkey, op.cit.

-40-

The computation s showed that the level of socio economic development
variable had a relatively large partial impact on the dependent variable,
but the standard error was too large for the coefficient to be statis
tically significant at 5 percent level.

On the other hand the sign of

the coefficient was positive in al I cases showing that fertility and
socio-econom ic development was positively correlated.

VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis reveals the strength and significanc e of the

relationship between various socio-econom ic variables and the fertility
behavior of the population in Turkey.

However, caution must be exercised

in the interpretati on of the findings of such a study.

Strong inferences

to the causal relationship would be unwarranted and misleading. Given
the constraints and I imitations of such a study, the fol lowing pattern
emerges from the analysis of the relationship between the socio-econom ic
variables and the fertility in Turkey.
Education in general, and female education in particular, seems to
be the most important variable causing the ferti I ity differentia ls in
various provinces of Turkey. The adverse relationship between literacy
and female primary school graduates on one hand and the total fertility
and chi Id-woman ratio on the other is so significant and consistent that
one is led to believe that the relationship must be a causal one. It is
plausible that education depresses fertility by helping individuals to
learn about contraceptio n and by providing opportuniti es that may conflict
with chi Id-rearing as wet I as by affecting the values and overal I outlook
of people towards I ife.
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The relationship between the level of industrializatio n and ferti 1ity also seems to be an adverse one even though the coefficients were not
statistically significant.

Industrializatio n is expected to depress

fertility by changing the entire pattern of I iving and expectations of the
people.

On the other hand, the level of urbanization, contrary to the

expected, has proven to have hardly any impact on fertility, and more
importantly, the relationship between the two variables was positive.

The

only plausible explanation to be given for this finding is that the type
of urbanization taking place in Turkey, I ike in most underdeveloped
countries, is not conducive to a rapid transformation of the values and
life style of the people migrating to the cities. A majority of these
migrants are employed in various services and the rate of unemployment runs
high among them.

They do not mix socially with other city dwellers and

they I ive in squatter houses on the periphery of the larger cities.

Under

these circumstances it is understandable why the mere i11cldence of
urbanization does not automatically produce lower fertility for at least
a generation or so.
The present analysis is inconclusive as far as the relationship be
tween the level of per capita income and fertility is concerned.

However

it is necessary to make a distinction between the partial and overall im
pact of the level of income. Even though the level of per capita income
does not seem to have any significant partial impact on the fertility
differentials among

various provinces, it is very highly correlated with

some modernization variables including literacy and formal education.

The
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level of I iteracy as wel I as the level of industrialization, both of which
seem to have a depressing effect on fertility, are relatively higher in
provinces with higher per capita incomes.
Finally, the distance from the Western provinces of Turkey explains a
surprisingly high percentage of the variance in the fertility data~ The
farther the distance from the West the higher the fertility rate becomes.
One explanation for this phenomenon is the fact that the population of the
Western provinces have been historically in closer contact with the Euro~
pean communities mostly as a result of migration and have been influenced
by the style of I ife and standards of these communities.
It is appropriate here to pause to ask what such an analysis adds to
our knowledge concerning the economics-fertility issue in underdeveloped
countries. At the expense of repeating ourselves, it should be stated at
the outset, that the relationship between the socio-economic factors and
fertility is obviously a more complicated matter than can be explained by
the few quantifiable variables selected here.

And thus, the present analy

sis should be considered a first step in the exploration of the underlying
factors of the economics-fertility issue, instead of being conclusive.
In addition, this type of analysis i I luminates the so-cal led "demo
graphic transition 11 phenomenon.

It is thought that the pattern of decline

infertility rates following the decline in mortality rates, as occurred
in West European countries during the previous century, will repeat itself
in the present day underdeveloped countries, as these countries go through
a period of increasing per capita incomes, industrialization and rapid
urbanization.

However, an important factor that often escapes the eye is
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the fact that the decline in mortality rates in West European countries
fol lowing the industrial revolution was the result of the transformation
of the whole socio-economic system, whereas the relatively rapid decline
in mortality rates in the underdeveloped countries, particularly since
the Second World War, is attributable mainly to external factors such as
the introduction of the practices of modern medicine and preventive health
measures. Thus it may be misleading to compare the underlying factors be
hind the decline in mortality In these two groups of countries.
The findings of this study suggest that the impact of the so-called
modernization variables, with the exception of education, is not very
significant in depressing the fertility rates in a country like Turkey,
at the present stage of economic development. Even though the static
nature of this analysis does not al low us to predict the impact of the
changes in the selected variables on terti !ity, throughout time, the
relatively low level of the partial impact of per capita income differen
tials, urbanization and even industrialization should justify the above
conclusion.

These findings do not support the view that a rapid demographic

transition wil I take place in the underdeveloped countries, once these
countries accelerate their economic growth associated with rapid urbani
zation.

The decline infertility rates in underdeveloped countries wi I I

probably be realized at a slower pace than most people expect.

It wi I I

also require overwhelming changes in the attitudes, values and institu
tions alongside with gains in per capita income. And the present study
gives a clue that education may be the key variable in this process.

